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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHERISE ROUNDY (BARNEY) BLACK, 
Petitioner/Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
V. CRAIG BARNEY, 
Respondent/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee. 
Case No. 990535-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In addition to the issues presented for review in the Brief 
of Appellant, Cherise Black presents the following issue for 
review pursuant to her cross-appeal: 
1. Should Mr. Black's dental practice be considered a 
marital asset subject to division? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review for all of the issues raised by Mr. 
Barney is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
We will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact 
in a divorce proceeding unless such findings are 
clearly erroneous. On appeal, it is the burden of the 
party seeking to overturn the trial court's decision to 
"marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
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'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making 
them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Hagan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974), 
the court outlined the nature of an appeal of the financial and 
property interests awarded in a divorce: 
In a divorce action, the trial court has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are indulged with a 
presumption of validity. The burden is upon appellant 
to prove that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings as made; or there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error; or a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Application of § 30-3-5(8) of the Utah Code Annotated (1995 
Replacement), is of central importance to the appeal, as is Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce action. 
Course of Proceedings 
Cherise filed a complaint for divorce on March 26, 1997. R. 
1. 
Trial occurred on October 27th and October 29th, 1998. 
R. 526-27. Over objection, expert testimony of the value of Mr. 
Barney's dental practice was received. R. 994, pp. 234-97. On 
2 
June 8, 1999, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Divorce Decree. R. 813a-866. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nontermlnable Alimony 
1. Cherise's need for alimony is greater than Mr. Black's 
ability to provide it, due to the parties' extravagant lifestyle 
and to Cherise's inability to support herself at the expense 
level she had had in the marriage. R. 850 (Paragraph No. 32). 
2. Mr. Black's ability to pay alimony in the near term is 
limited by his income and his need to pay child support, back 
taxes and other obligations. R. 850, 851 paragraph No. 35). 
3. The alimony award was $2,000 per month for the first 
five years and $3,000 per month thereafter. R. 851, 853 
(Paragraph Nos. 36 and 41). 
3. Cherise's total alimony award is reduced if she 
remarries but a portion of the alimony awarded to Cherise is 
nonterminable. In the near term, her alimony award is reduced by 
25% (to $1,500 per month, versus $2,000) and after five years the 
reduction is 33% ($2,000 per month, versus $3,000). R. 853,854 
(Paragraph 42) . 
4. The trial court found that it is unlikely that Cherise 
will ever be able to earn sufficient income to support her and 
her family in the lifestyle she enjoyed during the parties1 
marriage. R. 850 (Finding of Fact No. 31). 
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5. The trial court made a detailed finding of fact 
rding the award of nonterminable alimony: 
43. Non terminable alimony is appropriate under 
the facts of this case because: 
a. Although the Petitioner was pursuing a 
college degree at the time of the parties1 marriage, 
she set aside her personal and educational pursuits in 
order to raise five children, to be at home with them, 
to maintain the household and to enable and assist 
Respondent in obtaining his professional degree as well 
as develop his professional skills. 
b. The Petitioner devoted all of her attention 
to raising the family and supporting the Respondent 
during her twenty three years of marriage to the 
Respondent. 
c. Both parties had approximately equal earning 
capacity, education and experience going into the 
marriage. During the marriage, Petitioner was not able 
to advance her earning abilities because of her support 
of the family and of Respondent's professional 
education and business. 
d. Respondent was able to obtain a dental 
degree, a graduate degree in dentistry, acquire 
seventeen (17) years of dental experience and 
establish his own private practice, giving him the 
earning ability of $13,500.00 a month, all with the 
support of the Petitioner. 
e. Both parties were equal contributors in 
advancing Respondent's educational training. 
f. Petitioner assisted in the dental practice 
when needed. 
g. Petitioner has minimal earning capacity and 
no marketable skills. It is not likely given her age 
of forty three (43) years that Petitioner will be able 
to ever attain the skills or earning capacity to 
support herself at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
h. Petitioner contributed $125,000.00 of her 
inheritance into the marriage. 
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i. The parties spent all of the money that 
Respondent earned. The parties are left with virtually 
no assets to be divided among them at the end of the 
marriage. 
j. The parties have no retirement benefits or 
savings other than an IRA. 
k. Petitioner is entitled to a non-terminable, 
award of alimony because of her contribution to 
Respondent's increased earning capacity during the 
marriage. 
1. The only way to provide the Petitioner a 
compensating adjustment for her contribution to the 
greatly enhanced earning capacity of the Respondent is 
to award her non-terminable alimony. 
m. Non-terminable alimony will be necessary to 
maintain Petitioner at a standard of living similar to 
that which existed during the marriage. 
n. This award of alimony is not an award of any 
interest in the professional degree of Respondent. 
Respondent's income from his practice may change 
without affecting the amount of alimony he pays to the 
Petitioner. 
o. Respondent has the ability to pay non 
terminable alimony which is less than the court ordered 
alimony in paragraphs 36 and 41 above. 
854-856, Paragraph No. 43). 
Child Support 
6. The trial court made the following findings of fact 
rding child support: 
23. The parties have three minor children: 
Angelina Cherise, 12/21/82; Sandin Craig, 9/18/85; and 
Fabione Sadie Marcella, 12/19/87. Respondent should 
pay support for these children until each attains age 
18 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs 
last. 
24. The parties' children have become accustomed 
to a high standard of living. 
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25. The parties' children should be given support 
at a minimum to allow them to continue their lives with 
some semblance to what they have had in the past. 
26. The children should not be punished 
financially by this divorce. 
27. The children can be and deserve to be 
maintained at their accustomed standard of living. They 
need higher child support than the maximum provided by 
the statutory table. 
28. Respondent is able to pay more child support 
than would be required under statutory guidelines. 
29. Respondent can and should pay an amount equal 
to sixteen point three percent (16.6%) of his current 
pretax income as child support. 
848, Paragraph Nos. 23-29). 
Division of Property 
7. The trial court made the following findings of fact 
rding the tax obligations of the parties: 
15. Respondent should be ordered to pay all of 
the parties1 past due Internal Revenue Service debt for 
the years 1995 and 1996f to hold Petitioner harmless 
therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment 
she makes thereon. The IRS debt for 1995 is three 
thousand five hundred fourteen dollars ($3,514.00). 
The IRS debt for 1996 is sixty two thousand three 
hundred twelve dollars (S62,312.00). . . . 
16. Respondent should be ordered to pay all of 
the parties1 past due state tax debts for the year 
1996, to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to 
indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. 
The Montana State Tax debt for 1995 is paid in full. 
The Montana State Tax debt for 1996 is nine thousand 
six hundred fifty seven dollars (S9,657.00). . . . 
17. In reaching its finding that all tax debt 
payments should be made by Respondent, the Court has 
considered the following factors, which the court also 
finds: 
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a. The income from which the taxes are assessed 
was earned [sic] Respondent; 
b. The Respondent alone has the earning ability 
to pay such tax liability; 
c. Petitioner contributed her inheritance of one 
hundred twenty five thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to 
the marital estate; 
d. Respondent was primarily in control of the 
family finances during the marriage while the taxes 
were being incurred. 
844-846, Paragraph Nos. 15-17). 
8. The trial court made the following findings of fact 
rding marital debts: 
21. Respondent is ordered to pay all marital debt 
incurred prior to April 1997 not specifically addressed 
under paragraphs 15 through 20 above, to hold 
Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify 
Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. Except 
as otherwise ordered by this court, Petitioner is 
ordered to pay all debts separately incurred by her 
since her bankruptcy in 1998. Respondent is ordered to 
pay debts separately incurred by him after March, 1997 
in addition to the other debts assigned to him by the 
court. This order of marital debt payment is made, 
considering the following equities: 
a. The Respondent alone has the ability to pay 
such marital debts; 
b. Petitioner contributed her inheritance of one 
hundred twenty five thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to 
the marriage; 
c. Respondent was primarily in control of the 
family finances during the marriage while the marital 
debts were being incurred. 
22. The order that Respondent pay marital debt on 
behalf of the Petitioner is made by way of further 
support and maintenance for the Petitioner and is not 
to be considered a property settlement. Respondent 
should be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom 
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and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes 
thereon. 
847,848, Paragraph Nos. 21 & 22). 
Dental Practice Valuation 
9. The trial court made the following findings of fact 
respect to the value of Mr. Barney's dental practice: 
8. The court could not consider the following 
equities in dividing the dental assets because of the 
decision of Sorenson v. Sorenson 839 P2.d 774 (Utah 
1992): 
a. Petitioner contributed all of her inheritance 
from her grandfather to the family's expenses in lieu 
of taking funds from the dental practice for that 
purpose. 
b. The court does not find a specific value in 
regards to the dental practice because of the decision 
in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). The 
court cannot consider the value of goodwill and 
reputation of Respondent's dental practice. Although 
only forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) of the value 
of the dental practice is divisible as marital 
property, there was substantial evidence that the 
dental practice has the value assigned by Petitioner's 
appraiser of two hundred twenty seven thousand dollars 
($227,000.00) which included goodwill. 
c. The parties have the following education and 
work experience: 
i. Respondent completed three years of his 
bachelor's degree prior to the marriage. 
ii. Petitioner attended college prior to the 
marriage of the parties. 
iii. The parties were married in June 1974. 
iv. Respondent was accepted to dental school at 
the University of Iowa beginning the 1974-1975 school 
year. Respondent's first year of dental school was 
accepted as credit for the fourth year of his 
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bachelor's program and he was awarded his bachelor's of 
science degree in 1975. 
v. Respondent's dental schooling at Iowa was 
paid for by the United States Air Force through a 
health professional scholarship. Respondent's books, 
tuition and fees were paid and Respondent received a 
$400.00 per month stipend. Both parties worked 
part-time jobs during schooling to supplement 
the parties income. 
vi. Respondent was awarded his dental degree in 
1978. 
vii. Respondent also attended the Oregon Health 
Science University from 1982 to 1984 and was awarded a 
certificate in periodontics in 1984. 
viii.Petitioner left her university studies in 
Utah to go with Respondent to an out-of-state dental 
school. 
ix. At the time the parties began having 
children, the parties agreed that Petitioner would stay 
home to care for the children and the household. 
Petitioner spent twenty three years of the marriage 
supporting Respondent by caring for Respondent, raising 
the parties' five children, and caring for the 
household while Respondent pursued schooling and 
developed his career. Petitioner stayed at home with 
the children throughout the marriage and did not obtain 
formal schooling or work experience. 
x. Petitioner has worked sporadically in 
Respondent's dental practice substituting for regular 
office employees and as a dental assistant when 
necessary. Petitioner also helped Respondent set up and 
decorate his office. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly found and ordered that a portion 
of the alimony to Cherise is to be nonterminable. The trial 
court made the appropriate findings of fact, which, when taken in 
their totality, justify the imposition of permanent, 
nonterminable alimony. 
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A proper consideration of the needs of the children in 
setting child support includes considering their general standard 
of living. The trial court properly ordered child support in 
this case above the maximum allowed in the table. 
There was a proper division of property and marital debts in 
the divorce. 
The trial court erred in not considering the value of Mr. 
Barney's dental practice as a marital asset divisible in the 
divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Cherise Nonterminable 
Alimony. 
Appellant has failed to establish the impropriety of the 
trial court's awarding Cherise permanent alimony. This Court, in 
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
stated: "The standard of review relating to alimony requires that 
we not disturb the trial court's award unless ^such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion.' English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)." 
In general, awarding alimony requires a trial court to 
consider "the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; 
and the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. 
The case of Martinez is illustrative and probative. In that 
case, this Court had increased an award of permanent alimony 
based on the findings that the marriage had lasted 15 years, Mrs. 
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Martinez had assisted Mr. Martinez in getting his medical degree, 
including financial assistance from Mrs. Martinez and her mother, 
and based on Mr. Martinez substantially increased earning 
capacity which had not yet benefited the Mrs. Martinez and the 
family. While a portion of the court of appeals decision (having 
to do with the medical degree and "equitable restitution") was 
overturned by the Supreme Court, the award of increased permanent 
alimony was not. 
The Supreme Court, in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 
542 (Utah 1991) gave the following guidance to trial courts on 
the issue of awarding alimony, which in the case before it was 
permanent: 
Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed in 
light of the standard of living they had during 
marriage. . . . In some circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to try to equalize the spouses1 respective 
standards of living. . . . When a marriage of long 
duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change 
in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change, unless 
unrelated to the efforts put forward by the spouses 
during marriage, should be given some weight in 
fashioning the support award. . . . Thus, if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
Here, the trial court found that the parties would 
have enjoyed a higher family income because of Dr. 
Martinez's increased income, which was due to some 
extent to the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage. Although Dr. Martinez earned $100,000 a year 
before the parties divorced, Mrs. Martinez had not 
enjoyed a higher standard of living as a result of that 
increased income. 
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(citations omitted). 
Mr. Black relies almost exclusively on this Court's decision 
in Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1993), for his 
assertion that the trial court abused its discretion. The 
Johnson case is not controlling and is vastly different in 
setting and result from the present case. Only two findings were 
made by the trial court in Johnson in support of its award of 
nonterminable alimony. One finding was a generic "alimony was 
xto assist in the support of [Mrs. Johnson],' and the second was 
the impermissible division of Mr. Johnson's career ("'further 
assist in allowing [Mrs. Johnson] to share in the benefits of 
[Mr. Johnsonfs] professional status.'"). Id. at 251. 
This Court dealt summarily with the first finding: 
The [trial] court stated that it granted 
nonterminable alimony "to assist in the support of 
[Mrs. Johnson]." This is a permissible ground for an 
alimony award. See Haumorrt, 793 P.2d at 423 (purpose of 
alimony is to maintain the receiving spouse, as nearly 
as possible, in the same standard of living that 
existed during the marriage); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 
116, 121 (Utah App. 1990 (same). Standing alone, 
however, it is not a sufficient reason to extend 
alimony payments beyond the remarriage of the receiving 
spouse. To allow nonterminable awards to be based on 
this justification alone would violate the statutory 
presumption against such awards, since every alimony 
award is necessarily based upon this justification. 
Id. at 252. 
This Court's ruling on this issue is clear and unassailable. 
Mr. Black incorrectly states the Court's holding as: "a recipient 
spouse's need for alimony does not support an award of 
nonterminable alimony." Appellant's Brief at 13. The correct 
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holding is that the spouse's need, standing alone, is an 
insufficient basis for awarding permanent alimony. It is, 
however, properly considered with all other relevant factors. 
Mr. Black essentially argues that this Court consider each 
of the 15 separate findings made by the trial court in support of 
the award of permanent alimony in isolation. Thus, he concludes, 
no one of the findings is legally sufficient to justify a 
permanent alimony award. 
Of course, when dealing with an alimony award, which is an 
equitable remedy, the totality of the circumstances must be 
considered. When viewed in that appropriate light, the trial 
court provides more than sufficient justification for its award 
of permanent alimony. 
The Black's marriage was of long duration, 23 years. 
Cherise sacrificed her own pursuit of a degree (she was enrolled 
in college at the time of her marriage to Mr. Black) and a career 
to raise children and manage the household. She assisted in the 
development of Mr. Black's practice and was actively involved in 
its progression. She committed a personal inheritance of 
$125,000 to the marriage, with nothing now to show for the 
investment. 
Mr. Black has the ability to pay the alimony awarded. The 
trial court properly considered Mr. Black's earning capacity, his 
financial needs and those of Cherise in fashioning an award that 
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requires both parties to reduce their spending and attempt to 
equalized standards of living so far as possible. 
Cherise has limited earning capacity and minimal marketable 
skills. Given her age and her skills, it is highly unlikely 
Cherise can ever attain a professional standing similar to Mr. 
Black's or approaching that which she could have attained had she 
not married and cared for Mr. Black and their children. 
Their are virtually no assets to be distributed in a 
property settlement of this marriage, due to the parties' 
profligate ways. There are no retirement benefits or savings 
other than in IRA. 
Cherise will need nonterminable alimony to allow her to 
maintain a standard of living more in line with what she became 
accustomed to in the marriage. 
This is the story told by the trial court's findings of 
fact. The trial court clearly establishes all the necessary 
elements to grant permanent alimony. If the trial court has 
abused its discretion in this case, there can be no case in which 
permanent alimony is proper. 
How different is this from the underlying facts in Johnson? 
Dramatically different. This Court noted that the Johnson's had 
"stipulated to an equal division of real and personal property, 
yielding $428,000 for her and $428,000 for him. Each party 
received over $200,000 of income-producing personal property." 
Johnson at 251. Without noting an amount, this Court further 
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recognized that "The trial court also awarded to Mrs. Johnson 
one-half of Mr. Johnson's pension plan." 
Unlike the present case, Mr. Johnson's career development 
(with Mrs. Johnson's assistance) had already produced significant 
tangible assets for division by the parties. No such assets are 
available for division in the present case, making the trial 
court's findings of the justification for permanent alimony all 
the more persuasive. 
The Johnson case and others relied on by Mr. Black contain 
almost no findings of fact, or base their decisions for permanent 
alimony on impermissible findings. Thus, in Haumont v. Haumont, 
793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court overturned an award 
of permanent alimony where the sole justification by the trial 
court for the award appeared to be that, as a result of her 
marriage to the petitioner, respondent lost the same amount in 
alimony from a previous marriage. Johnson, Haumont and others 
stand in stark contrast to the thorough and complete findings 
made by the trial court in the instant case. 
The decision of the trial court should be upheld. 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Child Support 
In Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
this Court held: "'In reviewing child . . . support proceedings, 
we accord substantial deference to the trial court's findings and 
give it considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate 
relief.'. . . We will not disturb the district court's actions 
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unless the court exceeded the limits of its permitted 
discretion.7' Id. at 1006. (citation omitted). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.12 expressly allows 
awarding child support payments in excess of the maximum allowed 
by the Uniform Guidelines, on a "case-by-case" basis. This 
Court, in Ball, noted that: "Accordingly, under [this statute], 
the trial court had discretion to order 'an appropriate and just 
support amount,! so long as it was not less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children due 
support." Id. at 1014. 
In this case, the trial court made adequate findings of the 
children's needs and these findings were not disputed by Mr. 
Black at the time of trial or in his brief on appeal. These 
findings include: (a) the children are accustomed to a high 
standard of living; (b) their support should allow them to 
continue their lives with some semblance of what they had in the 
past; (c) the children should not be punished financially from 
the divorce; (d) the children need higher support than the table 
allows; and, (e) Mr. Black is able to provide that support. 
These findings stand in stark relief to the dearth of 
evidence supporting the trial courts' awards in the two cases 
relied upon by Mr. Black. In Ball, for example, in remanding an 
award of child support, this Court noted: 
The [trial] court declared the total monthly child 
support award in the following words: "Based upon the 
above figures [(referring to Mr. Peterson's monthly 
gross income)], child support should be awarded to [Ms. 
16 
Ball] in the amount of $ 1,520.00 pursuant to the child 
support guidelines." It appears the trial court arrived 
at its total monthly child support award through linear 
extrapolation of the child support table. However, the 
court provided no findings -- other than Mr. Peterson's 
income — to explain how it arrived at $1,520. 
Id. at 1014. 
Similarly, in Rhinehart v. Rhinehart, 963 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), this Court held: 
In this case, both the parties and the trial court 
focused on defendant's dramatic increase in income 
rather than the children's needs. 
A demonstration of an increase in the obligor's income 
alone is not sufficient to increase the child support 
order. The increase in ability to pay must be 
considered in light of the children's actual needs in 
fashioning an "appropriate and just" child support 
award under section 78-45-7(12). 
The trial court did not simply consider Mr. Black's ability 
to pay more in child support when it established the amount. It 
specifically found that the children needed the amount awarded to 
maintain their life styles and so as to avoid punishing them 
financially because of the divorce. 
Mr. Black incorrectly contends that more specific findings 
were necessary, of a qualitative or quantitative nature, to 
establish "need." He argues that since the children do not have 
extraordinary expenses, lessons, private schooling and the like, 
that no higher award of child support than the maximum under the 
table, is justified. In fact, "need" is based on accustomed 
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standards of living, which is the only lifestyle the children in 
a divorce have come to know. 
The findings made by the trial court are in complete harmony 
with the well-established statements of what constitutes "need" 
made by appellate courts. Thus, in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 
713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court reiterated the accepted 
definition of need: "Child support awards should approximate 
actual need and, when possible, assure the children a standard of 
living comparable to that which they would have experienced if no 
divorce had occurred." (citation omitted). 
Those were the exact findings made by the trial court, and 
Mr. Black has chosen not to marshal any evidence to dispute the 
validity of those findings. The burden is on Mr. Black to 
establish in what way the trial court abused its discretion in 
making the finding that the children had an accustomed lifestyle 
that could only be maintained by the award made. This he has not 
done. 
In fact, the evidence is legion and undisputed that the 
parties had an extravagant lifestyle, lived beyond their 
substantial means, and that the children participated in that 
lifestyle right along with the parents. 
The trial court's decision regarding child support must be 
upheld. 
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Ill. The Trial Court Correctly Divided Property and Debts 
The trial court's decision as to property divisions 
(including debts) is given substantial deference. The Utah 
Supreme Court has noted: 
This Court endows the [trial] court's adjustment of the 
financial interests of the parties with a presumption 
of validity and does not review their values absent a 
clear abuse of discretion . . . . We do not lightly 
disturb property divisions made by the trial court and 
uphold its decision except where to do so would work a 
manifest injustice or inequity. 
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1987). 
Contrary to Mr. Black's assertion, the trial court not only 
may but must consider all of the parties' circumstances, 
including alimony and child support, as it fashions a property 
division. 
This Court, in Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991), noted: 
In fashioning an equitable property division, trial 
courts need consider all of the pertinent 
circumstances. Factors generally considered are: 
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether 
the property was acquired before or during the 
marriage; the source of the property; the health of the 
parties; the parties1 standard of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the 
duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; 
the parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce; 
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the 
necessary relationship the property division has with 
the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. 
Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has 
made any contribution toward the growth of the separate 
assets of the other spouse and whether the assets were 
accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the 
parties. 
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In this case, Mr. Barney has been helped in establishing his 
practice by the efforts of his wife at home. Cherise worked with 
Mr. Barney through the lean years as he was earning his dental 
degree and working for the military. Mr. Barney began to make 
large amounts of money within the last five years of the 
marriage. 
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382-1383 (Utah 1980), the 
court held that "the fact that . . . Plaintiff has not increased 
her earning capacity to the extent of Defendant, speaks in favor 
of the trial courts distribution [of two-thirds to the wife]." In 
the present case, a substantially more drastic difference in 
earning capacities resulted than in Kerr: Cherise has not worked 
at all but has raised the family while Mr. Barney obtained his 
dental degree, gained his experience and built his practice. 
Cherise is now left at 44 years of age with only a high school 
education and no marketable skills. 
Cherise received $125,000.00 as inheritance from the sale of 
her grandfather's farm during the last ten years which money has 
been absorbed into the marital estate to help the family pay for 
basic expenses during the lean years. 
The trial court's decision on property division was 
equitable and was supported by the facts and the law. 
IV. The Trial Court Should Have Divided the Dental Practice 
As a Marital Asset 
Mr. Barney's business should be considered an asset of the 
marital estate. In Sorenson v. Sorenson 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 
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1992), the Supreme Court of Utah held that the husband's solo 
dental practice had no value to be divided as part of the marital 
estate. Justice Durham filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief 
Justice Zimmerman joined. The majority held that based on the 
appraiser's testimony that the value in the dental practice 
depended on the Husband's future earning capacity, his practice 
could be not considered as a marital asset. The dissent thought 
the Court's holding should be restricted to a finding of no 
equity only on the value of the practice which depends on the 
future earning capacity of the spouse. Id. 
The present case is distinguishable from Sorenson. In this 
case, the value of the dental practice currently can be separated 
from the ongoing ability of Mr. Barney to earn in the future. 
This value makes the practice marketable. Mr. Barney could sell 
his practice for a substantial sum and go to work for another 
dentist using his skills and abilities to gain a very good income 
stream without any ownership in his practice. The value of the 
practice without Mr. Barney's particular skills and reputation is 
based upon the combination of the referral base, location, 
patient list employees, location, accounts receivable and 
equipment which were assembled during the marriage. Mr. Barney 
has built a lucrative dental practice in a highly specialized 
area, periodontics. Not only will Mr. Barney have a substantial 
income stream from his dental practice, but he will also take 
with him a practice that has value as well. Cherise should be 
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entitled to share in the value of Mr. Barney's practice. The 
trial court erred in not awarding Cherise a equitable portion of 
the value of Mr. Barney's business. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted properly in its alimony, child support 
and property division decisions. Its order disallowing any 
credit to Appellee for the value of Mr. Barney's business should 
be reversed. 
DATED: June 7, 2000. 
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C. 
E. Jay Sheen 
Attorneys for Cherise Black 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, no addendum to Appellee's Brief is necessary. 
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